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11. INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial issues in industrial organization is market foreclo-
sure through vertical integration. Although one major advantage of vertical inte-
gration is to eliminate the problem of double marginalization, the major criticism
against vertical integration is market foreclosure, which has generated a signiﬁcant
amount of literature to examine the competitive structure of the upstream and
downstream industries and welfare.3 However, surprisingly enough the previous
literature on vertical integration has mainly concentrated on the production activ-
ities of the ﬁrms, paying less attention to the non-production activities of the ﬁrms
and particularly, of the downstream ﬁrms.4
In this paper, we consider product innovation, in the form of horizontal product
diﬀerentiation in the downstream market, as a strategic choice of innovative ﬁrms
facing a prospective threat of vertical integration and market foreclosure by an up-
stream monopolist. We examine how product innovation in the downstream market
aﬀects the upstream monopolist’s incentive for vertical integration and market fore-
closure, and how the possibility of vertical integration aﬀects the downstream ﬁrms’
incentive to diﬀerentiate products.
We use a simple model in which, without vertical integration, an upstream mo-
nopolist charges a linear price for the sole input required by two downstream ﬁrms
in order to produce the ﬁnal product. In the downstream market, ﬁrms compete
in quantities. In this setting, vertical integration of the upstream monopolist with
one of the two downstream ﬁrms eliminates double marginalisation in one segment
of the ﬁnal product market, and gives the integrated ﬁrm a cost advantage over the
downstream rival. Moreover, by setting the input price, the integrated ﬁrm aﬀects
its downstream competitor’s cost, and it may choose to foreclose the downstream
3Vertical foreclosure refers to restrictions in supply (resp. demand) a vertically integrated ﬁrm
would apply to its downstream (resp. upstream) competitors, extending in this way its market
power in the industry. Contrary to the benign view of the so-called Chicago school (e.g., Bork
(1978)), denying vertical foreclosure as an equilibrium consequence of vertical mergers, subsequent
works have proved vertical foreclosure in diﬀerent models of vertical integration. Among many
others: Salinger (1988), Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), Hart and Tirole (1990), Riordan
(1998), Chen (2001), Riordan and Chen (forthcoming). Rey and Tirole (2007) and Riordan
(forthcoming) provide excellent surveys of this literature.
4One exception is Baake, Kamecke and Norman (2004), who extend Hart and Tirole (1990)
model by considering physical capital investment as a non-production strategic decision of an
upstream monopolist. In their model, banning vertical integration has the social cost of a sub-
optimal level of capital investment, leading to productive ineﬃciency in the market, while vertical
integration guarantees the eﬃcient investment level but output is monopolistically restricted.
2market (i.e., to price the essential input suﬃciently high to drive the competitor
out of the industry).
The vertical structure of the industry (i.e., vertical integration vs. vertical
separation) is endogenously determined by an integration game modeled as a sale
auction between the downstream ﬁrms. If the gain from vertical integration exceeds
a ﬁxed integration cost, the upstream monopolist calls the downstream ﬁrms for
oﬀers in order to integrate one of them. Then, competition between the downstream
ﬁrms in the integration game allows the upstream monopolist to appropriate more
than the full surplus from integration, and reap most of the proﬁtc r e a t e di nt h e
ﬁnal product market. Therefore, vertical integration is a threat to the downstream
ﬁrms at the initial stage of the game, when they can invest in R&D to diﬀerentiate
products.
Besides the usual eﬀect of softening competition in the downstream market,
product diﬀerentiation exerts two more eﬀects in our model: it eliminates mar-
ket foreclosure under vertical integration, and it aﬀects the possibility of vertical
integration. The elimination of market foreclosure encourages innovation in the
downstream market. However, the trade-oﬀ between the beneﬁts from eliminating
market foreclosure and softening product market competition, on one hand, and
the loss from vertical integration, on the other hand, makes the impact of vertical
integration on innovation ambiguous.
In fact, we show that whether vertical integration is more likely for higher or
lower degrees of product diﬀerentiation is ambiguous and depends on the cost of in-
tegration. If the cost of integration is low, vertical integration always occurs. If the
cost of integration is moderate, vertical integration occurs for small and for large,
but not for intermediate, degrees of product diﬀerentiation. If the cost of integration
is suﬃciently high, but not large enough to prevent vertical integration, then ver-
tical integration only occurs for large degrees of product diﬀerentiation. Therefore,
while higher product diﬀerentiation softens competition in the ﬁnal goods mar-
ket, it may also create the threat of vertical integration, which helps the upstream
monopolist to extract more rent from the downstream ﬁrms. As a consequence,
there are situations where the downstream market prefers relatively lower degrees
of product diﬀerentiation to prevent vertical integration, so that, instead of market
foreclosure, we highlight less product innovation as a possible social cost of vertical
3integration.
Our paper is related to two literatures: the literature on vertical integration and
foreclosure, and the literature on product innovation. In the vertical integration
literature, previous works have analysed the incentives to vertically integrate and
foreclose the downstream market when the ﬁnal products are diﬀerentiated (e.g.
Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), Economides (1994), Colangelo (1995), Hackner
(2001)), Chen (2001)). However, the degree of product diﬀerentiation is exogenous
in all these studies, so that they do not consider the eﬀect exerted by the possibility
of vertical integration on product innovation.
The literature on product innovation has mainly focused on the eﬀects of prod-
uct market competition and R&D competition on the incentive to innovate. For
instance, Lambertini and Rossini (1998) and Lin and Saggi (2002)) study R&D
and product market competition in a setting similar to ours, where product in-
novation takes the form of horizontal product diﬀerentiation. A related literature
analyzes product diﬀerentiation in upstream and downstream markets under alter-
native market structures (e.g. Pepall and Norman (2001), Belleﬂamme and Toule-
monde (2003), Matsushima (2004)). Also this literature essentially concentrates on
the relationship between product diﬀerentiation and the intensity of product mar-
ket competition. On the contrary, we focus on a diﬀerent source of strategy, viz.
vertical integration, that may aﬀect both product market competition and the in-
centive for product innovation by innovative ﬁrms vertically related to an upstream
monopolist.
A handful of papers explicitly consider the role played by vertical relations in the
innovative ﬁrms’ incentive to invest in process or product innovations. Banerjee and
Lin (2003) focus on process innovations by oligopolistic downstream ﬁrms vertically
related to an upstream monopolist. They highlight a demand eﬀect associated with
a downstream process innovation, leading to an increase in the input price, and
hence, in the unit cost of the innovator’s competitors. This indirect eﬀect may
foster the downstream ﬁrms’ incentive to innovate. Economides (1999) considers
the choice of the quality levels of the upstream and the downstream components of
a ﬁnal product in a successive monopoly, and shows that vertical integration leads
to higher quality than vertical separation. In these papers, however, the vertical
structure of the industry is exogenous, and hence they do not address the strategic
4interaction between the incentive to innovate and the incentive to vertically merge.
Brocas (2003) and Buehler and Schmutzler (2007) consider the interplay be-
tween process innovation and endogenous vertical structure of the industry. Brocas
(2003) focuses on process innovations discovered by oligopolistic upstream ﬁrms
and licensed to the oligopolistic downstream ﬁrms. She shows that vertical inte-
gration can eﬀectively shelter an innovator from the competitive pressure of the
other potential innovators when the switching costs between diﬀerent technologies
are low. In this case, vertical integration and process innovation mutually rein-
force. Buehler and Schmutzler (2007) consider downstream process innovations in
a successive oligopoly with endogenous vertical integration. They highlight an in-
timidation eﬀect which increases the incentive to innovate of a vertically integrated
ﬁrm and decreases the incentive to innovate of the integrated ﬁrm’s competitors.
They further show that downstream process innovations decreases the likelihood of
a complete vertically separated structure of the industry. Besides our focus on prod-
uct instead of process innovation, we diﬀer from the two above mentioned papers
for the nature of the eﬀects exerted by vertical integration on innovation. We stress
that vertical integration can be a competitive threat from an upstream monopolist
to innovative downstream ﬁrms which may stiﬂe socially valuable innovations.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the model,
which consists of a three-stage game with the following timing: innovation stage
(ﬁrst stage), integration stage (second stage), market stage (ﬁnal stage). In Section
3 we solve the market stage under the two alternative vertical structures of the
industry (vertical integration vs. vertical separation) and we discuss the eﬀect
of product diﬀerentiation on market foreclosure. Section 4 analyzes the vertical
integration game and shows how the vertical structure of the industry depends on
product diﬀerentiation and integration costs. In Section 5 we study the eﬀects
of vertical integration on product innovation. In Section 6 we point out that the
possibility of vertical integration can cause the social cost of less product innovation.
Finally, Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
2. THE MODEL
We consider an industry with upstream and downstream markets. In the up-
stream market, a monopolist (ﬁrm U) produces the sole input needed by two down-
5stream ﬁrms (ﬁrms D1 and D2) in order to produce their ﬁnal products. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the upstream monopolist produces the essential input at
zero-cost. Both downstream ﬁrms require one unit of input to produce one unit
of the ﬁnal product, and they can diﬀerentiate the ﬁnal product at the outset by
investing in R&D.
More precisely, on the demand side of the downstream market, the degree of
product substitutability perceived by consumers, γ, leads to the inverse demand
system:
pi = a − qi − γqj (i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j),( 1 )
where γ ∈ [0,1].5 With γ =0 , consumers perceive products 1 and 2 as independent
goods, while γ =1corresponds to the consumers’ perception of perfect substitutes.
According to the demand system (1), a lower degree of product substitutability
rises consumers’ willingness to pay for the two diﬀerentiated products: for any given
quantities, p1 and p2 increase as γ falls. Thus, product diﬀerentiation generates
social value through consumers’ preference for variety.
The degree of product substitutability is set by the downstream ﬁrms’ R&D
investment. Since our main focus is on the eﬀect exerted by a prospective threat
of vertical integration on the incentive to innovate (i.e., horizontally diﬀerentiate)
products, we abstract from any strategic consideration related to R&D competition
by assuming that the two ﬁrms cooperate at the innovation stage.6 By paying a
ﬁxed R&D cost k, they can reduce the degree of product substitutability from γ =1
(perfect substitutes goods) to γ = b γ ∈ [0,1).W i t hn oR & Di n v e s t m e n t ,t h eﬁnal
5The demand side of the downstream market is a simpliﬁed version of Singh and Vives (1984).
The inverse demand sistem (1) arises from the representative consumer’s maximization of the
utility function: U = a(q1 + q2) − 1
2(q2
1 + q2
2 +2 γq1q2)+m (where m is a numeraire good),
subjected to a standard budget constraint.
6Lambertini and Rossini (1998) study R&D competition for product diﬀerentiation in the same
diﬀerentiated duopoly model we adopt here for the downstream market. Due to the strong positive
externality exerted by the R&D investment of one ﬁrm on the rival’s proﬁt, a simultaneous R&D
game can lead to a prisoner dilemma equilibrium, where the ﬁnal products remain homogeneous
even if both downstream ﬁrms would gain from product diﬀerentiation. One one hand, R&D
cooperation may be seen as a natural solution of such a prisoner dilemma problem, possibly
agreed by the downstream ﬁrms in a preliminary (implicit) stage of the model. On the other
hand, allowing for R&D competition complicates our model without changing the nature of the
eﬀects we focus on, and without qualitatively aﬀecting our main results. Furthermore, since the
downstream ﬁrms turn out to be symmetric in any respect at the innovation stage of our model, all
our results go through if we assume that only one ﬁrm has the capability of innovating (our measure
of the incentive to invest would simply scale down by one half). This suggests an alternative
interpretation of our model as an entry model, where one innovative ﬁrm can enter the downstream
market with a diﬀerentiated or with an homogeneous version of a ﬁnal product originally produced
by a downstream monopolist vertically separated from the upstream monopolist. The eﬀects of
the threat of vertical integration on the entrant’s incentive to diﬀerentiate the ﬁnal product would
be qualitatively similar to those presented in Section 5.
6products are perceived as perfect substitutes by consumers.
After the R&D decision is taken, the vertical integration stage takes place.
We model the vertical integration game as a ﬁrst-price sale auction. First, the
upstream monopolist decides whether to ask the downstream ﬁrms for simultaneous
and independent price oﬀers in order to integrate one of them. If the auction is
not organised, vertical integration does not occur. If the auction is organised,
each downstream ﬁrm decides whether to submit an oﬀer. On the basis of the
oﬀers received, the upstream monopolist then decides whether to integrate the
downstream ﬁrm asking for the lower price, paying the lowest bid (in the case of
tie, we assume that both downstream ﬁrms have ﬁfty percent probability of merging
with the upstream ﬁrm).7 We further assume that vertical integration involves a
ﬁxed integration cost, denoted by E.8
The outcome of the integration game sets vertical structure of the industry. If
vertical integration does not occur, the upstream monopolist supplies the essential
input to the downstream ﬁrms charging a linear price wu.9 The input price acts
as the marginal cost of production for both downstream ﬁrms, which ﬁnally com-
pete á la Cournot in the downstream market. If vertical integration occurs, the
downstream market is populated by a vertically integrated ﬁrm (ﬁrm V ), and an
independent ﬁrm (ﬁrm I). The integrated ﬁrm can use the essential input at zero-
cost, and optimally sets the price of the input supplied to the rival, wv.10 Finally,
7As many other works on vertical intergration (e.g., Hart and Tirole (1990)), we assume away
the possibility of horizontal mergers (in our case, between the two downstream ﬁrms), likewise
the complete integration of the industry in a single monopoly. Hence, if vertical integration
occurs, the upstream monopolist merges with one downstream ﬁrm only. While both assumptions
may derive from the antitrust authorities banning horizontal or vertical mergers resulting in the
monopolization of the downstream market or the whole industry, the second assumption may
simply be justiﬁed by the cost of vertically integrating both downstream ﬁrms being prohibitive.
As to the ﬁrst assumption, we recognize that the horizontal merger of the two downstream ﬁrms
may well represent an alternative strategy for them to face the threat of vertical integration other
than their strategic decision on product diﬀerentiation. We leave this extension of our model to
future research.
8See Hart and Tirole (1990) for the interpretation of the cost of vertical integration.
9Linear pricing of the essential input is a common assumption in the vertical integration litera-
ture (e.g., Salinger (1988), Ordover, et al. (1990), Colangelo (1995), Economides (1998), Hackner
(2001), Arya et al. (2007)). It is worth noting that although allowing for non linear pricing in
our model may solve the upstream monopolist problem of reaping proﬁt in the downstream mar-
ket, making vertical integration unecessary, it would exacerbate the downstream ﬁrms’ incentive
problem of (not) investing in socially valuable innovations.
10We consider the integrated ﬁrm as behaving as a single ﬁrm. However, all our results still
hold if we model the integrated ﬁrm as a multi-division ﬁrm that can optimally and credibly
(from the viewpoint of the independent ﬁrm) set the internal price at which the upstream division
provides the essential input to the downstream division. Interestingly, unless the ﬁnal products
are perfect substitutes (γ =1 ) or independent (γ =0 ), the integrated ﬁrm would internally price
the essential input above the marginal cost, using the internal price as an eﬀective instrument to
decrease the price and proﬁt erosion due to competition in the downstream market (while still
7the two ﬁrms compete á la Cournot in the downstream market.
Summarising, the model consists of three stages. In stage 1, the R&D decision
is taken by the downstream ﬁrms, and the degree of product diﬀerentiation is
determined. In stage 2, the vertical integration game takes place, and the vertical
structure of the industry is determined. In stage 3, the price of the essential input is
set by ﬁrm U (or ﬁrm V , under vertical integration), and Cournot competition takes
place in the downstream market. Production and proﬁts are ﬁnally determined.
The timing of the model reﬂects the idea that product innovation may require
longer time span investments than vertical integration. More speciﬁcally, the design
of new products may involve higher sunk costs and irreversible investments than
the process of vertical merger. Furthermore, product innovation often requires
speciﬁc skills and innovative knowledge diﬃcult to codify and transmit, which may
impede an external assessment of the innovation market value before the innovation
is fully developed, and raise standard agency issues in integrating innovative ﬁrms
before the innovation is fully developed. These considerations explain both our
assumptions that the innovation stage precedes the integration stage, and that the
characteristics of the ﬁnal products cannot be further altered after the innovation
stage.
Our solution concept is perfect subgame equilibrium. We therefore solve the
model by backward induction starting from the market stage.
3. THE MARKET STAGE
At the market stage, the degree of product diﬀerentiation, γ, and the vertical
structure of the industry (i.e., vertical integration or vertical separation) are already
determined.
Consider ﬁrst the market equilibrium under vertical separation. Given the input
price, wu, the downstream ﬁrms (D1 and D2) face the same marginal cost. Hence,
Cournot competition leads to a symmetric equilibrium in the downstream market,







setting the external price to optimally ﬁx the cost diﬀerential between the downstream division










The upstream monopolist faces the demand function for the essential input
2(a−wu)
2+γ ,











Equilibrium proﬁts under vertical separation are ﬁnally given by:
πD














We turn now to the market equilibrium under vertical integration. The inte-
grated ﬁrm produces its ﬁnal product at zero-cost, and charges the linear price wv
on the input sold to the independent ﬁrm. For a given input price wv > 0, Cournot
competition yields an asymmetric equilibrium in the downstream market, where
the independent ﬁrm (I) and the integrated ﬁrm (V ) produce, respectively:
qI(wv)=
a(2 − γ) − 2wv
4 − γ2 ,q V (wv)=
a(2 − γ)+γwv
4 − γ2 .
The corresponding proﬁts are:
πI(wv)=
∙
a(2 − γ) − 2wv
4 − γ2
¸2







a(2 − γ) − 2wv
4 − γ2
for the integrated ﬁrm, where the second term of the integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁta r i s e s
from its sales of the essential input to the rival. The input price, wv,i ss e tb yt h e




















´2 (2 − γ)(6− γ)
(8 − 3γ2)
.( 7 )
The following Lemma establishes some useful comparative results between the
market equilibria under vertical separation and under vertical integration.
Lemma 1. i) Unless products are independent or perfect substitutes, the input
price charged to the independent ﬁrm under vertical integration is lower than the
input price charged to the downstream ﬁrms under vertical separation (i.e., w∗
v <w ∗
u
for γ ∈ (0,1),w h i l ew∗
v = w∗
u for γ =0and γ =1 ). ii) Unless products are
independent, the independent ﬁrm earns lower proﬁts under vertical integration than
under vertical separation (i.e., πI <π D for γ ∈ (0,1]). iii) Both the equilibrium
proﬁt of the independent ﬁrm under vertical integration, πI, and the equilibrium
proﬁt of a downstream ﬁrm under vertical separation, πD, increase with product
diﬀerentiation (i.e., decrease with γ).











From the expression above it follows immediately that w∗
u − w∗
v > 0 for any
γ ∈ (0,1), while w∗
u − w∗
v =0for γ =0and γ =1 . 11
ii) From equations (3) and (6), we ﬁnd that πD ≥ πI is equivalent to:
8 − 4γ − 4γ2
8 − 3γ2 ≤ 1,
which is strictly satisﬁed for γ ∈ (0,1]. Equality clearly holds for γ =0 .











which is strictly negative for γ ∈ [0,1) (it equals zero for γ =1 ). Similarly, from










which is strictly negative for γ ∈ [0,1].
11More precisely, while the input price under vertical separation is independent of γ (see eq.
(2)), it is easy to show that the input price under vertical integration is a U-shaped function of γ
in the interval [0,1].
103.1. Vertical integration and market foreclosure
Before proceeding to the previous stages of the game, we pause here to discuss
the eﬀect of product diﬀerentiation on the possibility of market foreclosure under
vertical integration. Market foreclosure occurs if only the vertically integrated ﬁrm
is active in the downstream market, i.e., if qI(w∗
v)=0 .
Proposition 1. Vertical integration leads to market foreclosure only when prod-
ucts are perfect substitutes (i.e., only for γ =1 ).
Proof. From the expression qI(wv)=
a(2−γ)−2wv








any γ ∈ [0,1),a n dw∗
v =
a(2−γ)
2 for γ =1 . That is, market foreclosure occurs only
for γ =1 . In contrast, the independent ﬁrm remains active in the market for any
γ ∈ [0,1).
The interpretation of Proposition 1 is as follows. The integrated ﬁrm has a
strategic incentive to raise the input price charged to the independent ﬁrm, since
its price, production, and proﬁt in the downstream market increase with the rival’s
marginal cost. On the other hand, its sales of the essential input decrease. Intu-
itively, the strategic incentive to rise the rival’s cost strengthens with the degree of
product substitutability (it actually vanishes if products are independent, i.e., for
γ =0 ). According to Proposition 1, only when products are perfect substitutes the
strategic incentive is strong enough to induce the integrated ﬁrm to foreclose the
market and stop supplying the essential input to the rival.
Proposition 1 has an interesting implication for the previous stages of the game.
Since product diﬀerentiation allows to avoid market foreclosure, it also guarantees
both downstream ﬁrms positive proﬁts under vertical integration. On one hand, the
independent ﬁrm can assure a positive proﬁt only if products are diﬀerentiated. On
the other hand, by allowing the independent ﬁrm to gain a positive proﬁt, product
diﬀerentiation helps the downstream ﬁrm that vertically integrates to extract a
positive proﬁt from vertical integration even if the upstream ﬁrm has full bargaining
power.
114. THE VERTICAL INTEGRATION GAME
Having solved the market stage under the two alternative vertical structures
o ft h ei n d u s t r y ,w ea r en o wi nt h ep o s i t i o nt oe x a m i n et h ei n c e n t i v ef o rv e r t i c a l
integration. Recall that, at the vertical integration stage, the degree of product
diﬀerentiation is already determined. We start by noting that there is a positive
surplus to gain from vertical integration when the integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁts, net of
the ﬁxed cost of integration, exceed the joint proﬁts of the two ﬁrms involved in
the merger (i.e., the upstream monopolist and one downstream ﬁrm) under vertical
separation. Let us denote with S = πV − (πU + πD) the surplus from vertical
integration before the integration cost, so that the proﬁtability condition for vertical
integration is:
S − E>0. (8)
The upstream monopolist’s gain from integrating with a downstream ﬁrm asking
for an integration price P is given by:





When vertical integration is proﬁtable (i.e., when condition (8) holds), each
downstream ﬁrm always has an incentive to make a price-oﬀer to be vertically
integrated. If ﬁrm D2 does not make any oﬀe r ,i ti sc o n v e n i e n tf o rﬁrm D1 to
make an oﬀer between πD and πD +( S − E). S i n c eap o s i t i v es u r p l u si sl e f tt o
the upstream monopolist12,t h eo ﬀer will be accepted, and the bidder will gain
ah i g h e rp r o ﬁt than under the alternative of not making any oﬀer (without any
oﬀer, vertical integration does not occur, so that both downstream ﬁrms earn πD).
Alternatively, if ﬁrm D2 makes the above oﬀer, then it is convenient for ﬁrm D1
to undercut the rival’s oﬀer, since πD >π I (see Lemma 1). Furthermore, each
downstream ﬁrm has always an incentive to undercut any rival’s oﬀer Pj greater
than πI. By bidding above the rival, a ﬁrm ends up being the independent ﬁrm
under vertical integration, earning πI. By matching the rival’s oﬀer, it has equal
chances of being independent or integrated, with expected proﬁt 1
2(Pj + πI). It is
then optimal to bid just below the rival, say Pj − , which assures to be integrated
with a proﬁt Pj−  (> 1
2(Pj+πI) >π I). Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium pair of
12By integrating ﬁrm D1 at a price P = πD +  , with 0 < <S− E, the upstream monopolist
would gain (S − E) −  >0.
12oﬀers from the downstream ﬁrms is (πI,π I). The upstream monopolist is left with
more than the full surplus from integration13, so that it will certainly call for oﬀers
at the outset, and vertical integration occurs. Notice that, due to competition in
price-oﬀers to be integrated, the downstream ﬁrm that is ﬁnally integrated only
reaps its outside option under vertical integration (i.e. the equilibrium proﬁto ft h e
independent ﬁrm).
Assume now that vertical integration is not proﬁtable (i.e., condition (8) does
not hold). In this case, since the net surplus from integration is negative, the
upstream ﬁrm would reject any price-oﬀer equal to (or greater than) πD.14 Then,
if the upstream ﬁrm calls for oﬀers, the relevant Nash equilibrium of the auction
is that both downstream ﬁrms make an oﬀer which leaves the upstream ﬁrm with
negative surplus (any oﬀer above πD−(E−S) <π D will do), and the upstream ﬁrm
rejects.15 Clearly, neither downstream ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate by making
ap r i c e - o ﬀer low enough to be acceptable by the upstream ﬁrm, since the deviant
ﬁr mw o u l db ei n t e g r a t e da tap r i c eb e l o wπD. Hence, vertical integration does not
occur, and both downstream ﬁrms earn proﬁt πD. Anticipating this equilibrium
outcome, the upstream ﬁrm will not ask for oﬀers at the outset.
We have proved:
Lemma 2. If the net surplus from integration is positive (i.e., S − E>0),
vertical integration occurs, and the downstream ﬁrm involved in the merger earns
the same proﬁt as the independent ﬁrm, πI. If the net surplus from integration
is negative (i.e., S − E<0), vertical integration does not occur, so that both
downstream ﬁrms earn proﬁt πD.
We next characterize the vertical structure that will arise in the industry after
the integration stage as a function of the degree of product diﬀerentiation and
13By integrating one of the two downstream ﬁrms at the price P = πI, the upstream monopolist
gains: (S − E)+

πD − πI
> (S − E) > 0.
14By integrating a downstream ﬁrm at a price P = πD + , with   ≥ 0, the upstream monopolist
would get (S − E) −  <0 (since (S − E) < 0).
15Aq u a l i ﬁcation of this result is in order. When condition (8) does not hold, the pair of oﬀers
(πI,π I) still identiﬁes a Nash equilibrium. However, from the viewpoint of the downstream ﬁrms
(who are the only active players at the bidding stage of the vertical integration game), such an
equilibrium is strictly payoﬀ (pareto) dominated by the equilibrium adopted in the text. Pareto
dominance is therefore a ﬁrst criterion to select away the "bad equilibrium" (πI,π I).F u r t h e r m o r e ,
the “good equilibrium” indicated in the text would also be chosen against the “bad equilibrium”
(πI,π I) by other equilibrium selection criteria. For instance, since, for any player, the “good
equilibrium” strategy weakly dominates the “bad equilibrium” strategy, risk dominance would
also select the “good equilibrium”.
13the integration cost level. By Lemma 2, this amounts to evaluate the sign of the
net surplus from integration, S − E, along the range of product substitutability
γ ∈ [0,1].
Proposition 2. a) When the integration cost is low, vertical integration occurs
for any degree of product diﬀerentiation. b) When the integration cost is moder-
ate, vertical integration occurs only for large or for small (but not for intermediate)
degrees of product diﬀerentiation. c) When the integration cost is high (but not pro-
hibitive), vertical integration occurs only for large degrees of product diﬀerentiation.
Proof. Using equations (3), (4) and (7), the surplus from integration before the
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(8 − 3γ2)(2+γ)
2 (9)
Inspection of equation (9) suﬃces to show that S(γ) > 0 for any γ ∈ [0,1],t a k i n g
values S(1) <S (0). Furthermore, we prove in Appendix 1 that S(γ) is a U-shaped
function of γ over the interval [0,1], with a minimum value for γ ' 0.61037 (see Fig-
ure 1 below). From the shape of S(γ), the proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward.
Let us denote with Sm the minimum value of S(γ).
a)I fE<S m, the net surplus from integration is positive, and vertical integra-
tion occurs, for any γ ∈ [0,1];
b)i fSm <E<S (1), there must be two critical degrees of product substi-
tutability, γb1 and γb2 (with γb1 <γ b2), such that the net surplus from integration
is positive, and vertical integration occurs, for γ<γ b1 and γ>γ b2, while the net
surplus from integration is negative, and vertical integration does not occur, for
γ ∈ [γb1,γb2];
c)i fS(1) <E<S (0), there must be one critical degree of product substi-
tutability, γc (<γ b1), such that the net surplus from integration is positive, and
vertical integration occurs, only for γ<γ c.
Finally, if E ≥ S(0) the net surplus form integration is negative for any γ ∈ [0,1],
so that vertical integration never occurs (i.e., S(0) identiﬁes a threshold level above
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The interpretation of Proposition 2 relies on the U-shaped behaviour of the
gross surplus from integration as the degree of product diﬀerentiation decreases
(see Figure 1). Notice ﬁrst that a positive surplus from integration may come from
two sources in our model: 1) the avoidance of double marginalisation in one segment
of the ﬁnal product market; 2) the cost advantage (i.e., the lower marginal cost in
producing the ﬁnal product) of the integrated ﬁrm over the independent ﬁrm in the
downstream market competition.16
Suppose now that products are independent (i.e., γ =0 ) . In this case, only the
ﬁrst source of surplus is active, since the two segments of the downstream market
are isolated. As the degree of product diﬀerentiation starts decreasing (i.e., γ starts
increasing from 0), the total demand in the downstream market starts decreasing
as well, since consumers value less any bundle of the two products relative to the
numeraire good. The fall in the gross surplus from integration is then explained by
the lower gain from avoiding double marginalisation in a smaller market, while the
second source of surplus (i.e. the cost advantage) is still irrelevant since products
are almost independent. Only when the degree of product diﬀerentiation is suﬃ-
ciently low, the second source of surplus plays a signiﬁcant role. Then, the cost
advantage of the integrated ﬁrm allows it to soften the negative eﬀect exerted by a
further increase in γ on the demand for its ﬁnal product, since consumers tend to
substitute the high priced product of the independent ﬁrm for the low priced prod-
16The cost advantage is optimally set by the integrated ﬁrm, and allows it to expand its equi-
librium production and proﬁt in the downstream market at the expense of the independent ﬁrm.
Clearly, it negatively aﬀects the component of the integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁta r i s i n gf r o mt h es a l e s
of the essential input to the rival.
15uct of the integrated ﬁrm. Moreover, the integrated ﬁrm beneﬁts from a higher
reduction of the rival’s demand while playing the Cournot game in the product
market. Hence, the integrated ﬁrm has an incentive to increase the rival’s cost (by
rising the input price) as the degree of product diﬀerentiation further decreases.
When products are suﬃciently close substitutes, the second source plays a domi-
nant role, reversing the sign of the relationship between product diﬀerentiation and
surplus from integration.
5. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND PRODUCT INNOVATION
In this section, we analyse the eﬀects exerted by vertical integration on the
incentive to diﬀerentiate products. Recall that the two downstream ﬁrms cooperate
at the innovation stage: by paying a ﬁxed R&D cost k,they can reduce the perceived
degree of product substitutability, γ,f r o m1 to b γ ∈ [0,1). Products are perceived
as perfect substitutes (γ =1 )i fﬁrms do not invest.
For a given eﬀectiveness of the R&D investment (i.e., for a given degree of
product diﬀerentiation achievable by investing in R&D, 1 − b γ),w em e a s u r et h e
downstream ﬁrms’ incentive to invest in R&D by the joint-gain they would obtain
by decreasing the degree of product substitutability from 1 to b γ. This clearly cor-
responds to the highest R&D cost the innovative ﬁrms would be willing to pay in
order to diﬀerentiate their products to the degree 1−b γ, which we denote with b k(b γ).
To proceed, notice ﬁrst that, at the innovation stage, the two downstream ﬁrms
share identical proﬁt expectations under any subsequent evolution of the game
(i.e., the independent ﬁrm’s proﬁt πI(γ) under vertical integration, the downstream
ﬁrm’s proﬁt πD(γ) under vertical separation). Let π(γ) denote their proﬁt expec-
tation as a function of the degree of product substitutability. We clearly have:
b k(b γ)=2[ π(b γ) − π(1)]. (10)
Building upon Proposition 2, we next distinguish four cases according to the level
of the integration cost.
Low integration cost (case (a) of Proposition 2). Vertical integration will oc-
cur at the second stage of the game for any degree of product substitutability.
Therefore, independently of both the eﬀectiveness of the R&D investment and the
investment decision, both downstream ﬁrms will end up with the independent ﬁrm’s
16proﬁt under vertical integration (Lemma 2), and the expected proﬁt function at the
innovation stage coincides with the independent ﬁrm’s proﬁt function:
π(γ)=πI(γ), ∀ γ ∈ [0,1],
where πI(γ) is given by equation (6). Notice that, if the downstream ﬁrms do
not invest in R&D, products are perceived as perfect substitutes by consumers
and vertical integration leads to market foreclosure (Proposition 1). Hence π(1) =
πI(1) = 0, so that our measure of the incentive to invest in R&D becomes:
b ka (b γ)=2 πI(b γ), ∀ b γ ∈ [0,1). (10a)
Since the innovative ﬁrms’ proﬁt expectation always coincides with the proﬁto f
the independent ﬁrm under vertical integration, the incentive to invest in R&D
reﬂects the following three motives: 1) avoiding market foreclosure; 2) softening the
competitive pressure of a more eﬃcient ﬁrm (i.e., the integrated ﬁrm); 3) forcing
the integrated ﬁrm to charge a lower input price.17
Moderate integration cost (case (b) of Proposition 2). Vertical integration occurs
at the second stage of the game only for large and for small, but not for intermedi-
ate, degrees of product substitutability. Consequently, the innovative ﬁrms’ proﬁt
expectation will jump between the proﬁt of the independent ﬁrm under vertical
integration and the proﬁto fad o w n s t r e a mﬁrm under vertical separation at the
extremes of the interval of product substitutability where vertical integration does





πI(γ) for γ ∈ [0,γb1)
πD(γ) for γ ∈ [γb1,γb2]
πI(γ) for γ ∈ (γb2,1]
where πD(γ) and πI(γ) are given by equations (3) and (6), respectively. Like in the
case of low integration cost, if the downstream ﬁrms do not invest in R&D, then
vertical integration and market foreclosure occur at the ﬁnal stage of the game,
so that π(1) = πI(1) = 0. Hence, our measure of the incentive to invest in R&D
becomes:




2πI(b γ) for b γ ∈ [0,γb1)
2πD(b γ) for b γ ∈ [γb1,γb2]
2πI(b γ) for b γ ∈ (γb2,1)
(10b)
17For future reference, notice that e ka (e γ) always increases with the eﬀectiveness of the R&D
investment, 1 − e γ, as πI(γ) is monotonically decreasing in γ (Lemma 1).
17When the R&D technology allows the innovative ﬁrms to target the interval [γb1,γb2],
the outcome of the vertical integration game depends on their investment decision.
In such a case, the incentive to invest incorporates the additional motive of pre-
venting vertical integration (recall that, by Lemma 1, πD >π I for any γ ∈ (0,1]).
High integration cost (case (c) of Proposition 2). Vertical integration will oc-
cur only for small degrees of product substitutability (that is, for large degrees of
product diﬀerentiation). Therefore, the innovative ﬁrms’ proﬁt expectation jumps
from the proﬁt of the independent ﬁrm under vertical integration to the proﬁto fa
downstream ﬁrm under vertical separation at the critical degree of product substi-
tutability below which vertical integration occurs. Denoting such a critical degree
by γc (see Figure 1), we have:
π(γ)=
(
πI(γ) for γ ∈ [0,γc)
πD(γ) for γ ∈ [γc,1] .
Contrary to the previous cases, vertical integration and market foreclosure will not
occur in the subsequent stages of the game if the innovative ﬁrms do not invest
in R&D, that is, π(1) = πD(1) > 0. On the other hand, vertical integration
would follow the decision to invest in R&D when the resulting degree of product
diﬀerentiation is high. In other words, in the case under examination, not investing
in R&D may be the only way to prevent vertical integration at the following stage
of the game. Our measure of the incentive to invest in R&D becomes:
b kc (b γ)=
(
2[πI(b γ) − πD(1)] for b γ ∈ [0,γc)
2[πD(b γ) − πD(1)] for b γ ∈ [γc,1) .
(10c)
Prohibitive integration cost (benchmark case). If the integration cost exceeds
S(0) (i.e., the gross surplus from integration when γ =0 ), then vertical integration
never occurs at the second stage of the game. Therefore, the innovative ﬁrms’ proﬁt
expectation always coincides with the proﬁto fad o w n s t r e a mﬁrm under vertical
separation,
π(γ)=πD(γ), ∀ γ ∈ [0,1],
and our measure of the incentive to invest in R&D becomes:
b k∗ (b γ)=2 [ πD(b γ) − πD(1)], ∀ b γ ∈ [0,1). (10*)
The vertical integration stage of the model is, in this case, irrelevant for the down-
stream ﬁrms’ incentive to diﬀerentiate products, which mainly reﬂects the usual
18motive of softening the competitive pressure of a symmetric competitor in the
product market. Henceforth, we use the case of prohibitive integration costs as a
benchmark to contrast the eﬀects on product innovation arising from the threat of
vertical integration which characterises the previous cases.18
We start by comparing the case of low integration costs with the benchmark
case of prohibitive integration costs.
Proposition 3. Unless the eﬀectiveness of the R&D investment is very low
(i.e. b γ is very high), the innovative ﬁrms’ incentive to invest in R&D is stronger
when the integration cost is low (so that vertical integration always occurs) than
when the integration cost is prohibitive (so that vertical integration never occurs).
Proof. From equations (10a)a n d( 1 0 *), b ka (b γ) ≥ b k∗ (b γ) iﬀ
πI(b γ) ≥ πD(b γ) − πD(1).
Using equations (3) and (6), the last inequality reduces to:
16(1 − b γ)(6 + 3b γ)2 − (5 + b γ)
³




Calculations with Mathematica show that the polinomial on the LHS has only
one real root within the admissible range b γ ∈ [0,1),t h a ti sb γa ' 0.81682. Since
πI(0) ≥ πD(0) − πD(1) (recall that πI(0) = πD(0),b yL e m m a1 ,a n dπD(1) > 0),
it must be:
b ka (b γ) > b k∗ (b γ) for b γ ∈ [0,b γa),
b ka (b γ) < b k∗ (b γ) for b γ ∈ (b γa,1].
18As in the case of low integration costs, also with prohibitive integration costs the innovative
ﬁrms’ incentive to innovate products, e k∗ (e γ),a l w a y si n c r e a s e sw i t ht h ee ﬀectiveness of the R&D
investment, 1 − e γ,a sπD(γ) is monotonically decreasing in γ (Lemma 1).
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Figure 2a illustrates Proposition 3. The intuition is that, when the eﬀective-
ness of the R&D investment is very low, the gain from softening the competitive
pressure of a more eﬃcient competitor (i.e., the integrated ﬁrm under vertical in-
tegration) is smaller than the gain from softening the competitive pressure of a
symmetric competitor (i.e., the other downstream ﬁrm under vertical separation).
Although even mild degrees of product diﬀerentiation allow to avoid market fore-
closure under vertical integration, the resulting proﬁt of the independent ﬁrm is
negligible because both the cost disadvantage relative to the integrated ﬁrm and its
negative eﬀect on the independent ﬁrm’s proﬁt remain very strong when products
are poorly diﬀerentiated.19 On the contrary, when the eﬀectiveness of the R&D
investment is suﬃciently high, the gain from softening the competitive pressure of
the integrated ﬁrm dominates the gain from softening the competitive pressure of
a symmetric competitor. The independent ﬁrm’s proﬁt is no more negligible when
products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, since both the cost disadvantage (up to a
certain degree of diﬀerentiation) and its negative impact on the independent ﬁrm’s
proﬁt sharply decrease with product diﬀerentiation. This allows the incentive to
avoid market foreclosure to play the dominant role: with low integration costs (and
hence vertical integration), the downstream ﬁrms can guarantee a positive proﬁt
19In fact, it is easy to check that the independent ﬁrm’s proﬁtf u n c t i o n ,πI(γ), is ﬂat at γ =1 .
20only by investing in R&D and diﬀerentiating products, while, with prohibitive inte-
gration cost (and hence, vertical separation), they gain a positive proﬁt also without
investing in R&D.
Consider now the case of moderate integration costs. Clearly, if the innovative
ﬁrms cannot target the intermediate degrees of product diﬀerentiation where ver-
tical integration does not occur, a comparison with the benchmark case exactly
replicates Proposition 3. However, when the resulting degree of product substi-
tutability lies in the crucial interval [γb1,γb2], the possibility of preventing vertical
integration strengthens the innovative ﬁrms’ incentive to invest relative to both the
benchmark case and the case of low integration costs.
Proposition 4. Assume that the integration cost is moderate and the R&D
investment leads to the intermediate degrees of product diﬀerentiation where vertical
integration is prevented. Then the innovative ﬁrms’ incentive to invest in R&D is
stronger than under the alternative cases of prohibitive and low integration costs.
Proof. Assume that b γ ∈ [γb1,γb2].F r o me q u a t i o n s( 1 0 b)a n d( 1 0 *)w eg e t :
b kb (b γ) − b k∗ (b γ)=πD(b γ) − [πD(b γ) − πD(1)] = πD(1) > 0 .
This proves that the incentive to invest in R&D is stronger in the case of mod-
erate integration costs (where vertical integration and market foreclosure can be
prevented only by investing in R&D) than in the benchmark case of prohibitive
costs of integration (where vertical integration never occurs).
Similarly, using equations (10b)a n d( 1 0 a), we get:
b kb (b γ) − b ka (b γ)=πD(b γ) − πI(b γ) > 0 (by Lemma 1),
This proves that the incentive to invest in R&D is stronger in the case of moderate
integration costs (where the R&D investment allows to prevent vertical integration)
than in the case of low integration costs (where vertical integration always occurs).
Figure 2b illustrates Proposition 4.
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We turn now to the case of high integration costs, where vertical integration
occurs only for high degrees of product diﬀerentiation. If the eﬀectiveness of the
R&D investment is not high (i.e., if b γ>γ c), the incentive to invest in R&D
identically coincides with that of the benchmark case. On the contrary, if the
R&D eﬀectiveness is high (i.e., if b γ<γ c), the possibility of preventing vertical
integration by not-diﬀerentiating products weakens the innovative ﬁrms’ incentive
to invest relative to both the benchmark case and the case of low integration costs.
Proposition 5. Assume that the integration cost is high and the R&D invest-
ment leads to the high degrees of product diﬀerentiation where vertical integration
will occur. Then the innovative ﬁrms’ incentive to invest in R&D is weaker than
under the alternative cases of prohibitive and low integration costs.
Proof. Assume that b γ<γ c.F r o me q u a t i o n s( 1 0 c)a n d( 1 0 *), we get:
b kc (b γ) − b k∗ (b γ)=
£




πD(b γ) − πD(1)
¤
= πI(b γ) − πD(b γ) < 0 (by Lemma 1),
This proves that the incentive to invest is lower in the case of high integration costs
(where the R&D investment leads to vertical integration) than in the benchmark
case of prohibitive integration cost (where vertical integration never occurs).
22Similarly, from equations (10c)a n d( 1 0 a), we have:
b kc (b γ) − b ka (b γ)=
£
πI(b γ) − πD(1)
¤
− πI(b γ)=−πD(1) < 0,
This prove that the incentive to invest is lower in the case of high integration costs
(where vertical integration can be avoided only by not-investing in R&D) than in
the case of low integration costs (where vertical integration always occurs).
Figure 2c illustrates Proposition 5.
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To sum up, a prospective threat of vertical integration may have either posi-
tive or negative eﬀects on the downstream ﬁrms’ incentive to innovate products.
T h en a t u r eo ft h ee ﬀects crucially depends on how product innovation aﬀects the
upstream monopolist’s incentive to vertically integrate a downstream ﬁrm. When
vertical integration is an unavoidable outcome because of low integration costs,
the innovative ﬁrms’ incentive for product diﬀerentiation is stronger than under
the benchmark case of prohibitive integration costs only if products can be suﬃ-
ciently diﬀerentiated. With moderate integration costs, the incentive to diﬀerentiate
products incorporates the strategic motive of preventing vertical integration. Both
strong and weak degrees of product diﬀerentiation foster the upstream monopolist’s
23incentive to vertically integrate. Then, the downstream ﬁrms have a strategic in-
centive to target intermediate degrees of product diﬀerentiation in order to prevent
the upstream monopolist from reaping downstream proﬁts through vertical inte-
gration. Finally, high integration costs impede vertical integration unless products
are strongly diﬀerentiated.20 This gives the downstream ﬁrms a strategic incentive
to avoid high degrees of diﬀerentiation.
The following two examples may help to further illustrate our results.
Example 1. Suppose that the R&D investment allows the innovative ﬁrm to
obtain (exactly) the degree of product substitutability b γ = γb1 (see Figure 2b).
Given the ”point-to-point” nature of the R&D technology, in equilibrium we will
observe either no-diﬀerentiation (i.e., γ =1 ) if the innovative ﬁrms do not invest
i nR & D ,o rt h ed e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation 1 − γb1 (i.e., γ = γb1)i ft h e
innovative ﬁrms do invest. Let the R&D cost, k1,b es u ﬃc i e n t l yh i g hs u c ht h a t
b ka(γb1) <k 1 < b kb(γb1). Then, inspection of Figure 2b immediately reveals that we
will observe product diﬀerentiation in the downstream market only when moderate
integration costs give the innovative ﬁrms a strategic incentive to invest in R&D in
order to deter vertical integration.
Example 2. Suppose that the R&D investment allows the innovative ﬁrms to
reduce the degree of product substitutability up to a minimum level b γ2, with b γ2
slightly lower than γc (see Figure 3). Hence, if the innovative ﬁrms decide to invest
in R&D, they can also select the optimal degree of product diﬀe r e n t i a t i o ni nt h e
range (0,1 − b γ2].L e t t h e ﬁxed R&D cost, k2,b es u ﬃciently low such that k2 <
b kc(γc). Clearly, the innovative ﬁrms will choose the degree of diﬀerentiation that
maximize b k(b γ)−k2 = π (b γ)−π(1)−k2. Then, inspection of Figure 3 immediately
reveals that, whilst products will be diﬀerentiated in all cases, the innovative ﬁrms
will select the maximum degree of diﬀerentiation (i.e., 1 − b γ2), only in the cases
of low and prohibitive integration costs. On the contrary, the incentive to prevent
vertical integration will lead them to select lower degrees of diﬀe r e n t i a t i o ni nb o t h
cases of high and moderate integration costs (i.e., 1−γc and 1−γb1, respectively).
20In this case, the surplus from integration exceeds the integration cost only when the market
size is wide because products are strongly diﬀerentiated.
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Figure 3. Optimal degrees of product diﬀerentiation of Example 2 when
integration costs are: low (a); moderate (b); high (c); prohibitive (*).
5.1. A new social cost of vertical integration
The above analysis suggests that a threat of vertical integration faced by in-
novative ﬁrms vertically related to a monopolistic supplier may decrease welfare
by discouraging socially valuable innovations. The simplest way to show this is to
reconsider Example 2, where the innovative ﬁrm can select the optimal degree of
product diﬀerentiation up to a maximum level 1 − b γ2. Suppose that the integra-
tion cost is high enough to make the innovative ﬁrms’ incentive to prevent vertical
integration active (that is, cases b) or c) in Figure 3). As we have seen before, the
innovative ﬁrm will deter vertical integration by choosing a lower degree of product
diﬀerentiation relative to the benchmark case where the threat of vertical integra-
tion is absent. If we re-interpret the benchmark as the case of a severe antitrust
policy which bans vertical mergers, we can say that a lenient antitrust policy would
c a u s eal o w e rd e g r e eo fp r o d u c td i ﬀerentiation, while the vertical structure of the
market, that is, vertical separation, would be identical under the two policy regimes.
On the other hand, it is easy to prove that, given vertical separation, social welfare,
as measured by the total surplus in the market, increases with product diﬀerenti-
25ation. Consider ﬁrst industry proﬁts. The equilibrium proﬁts in the downstream
market increase with product diﬀerentiation (see Lemma 1 (point iii)). Similarly,
equation (4) clearly shows that the equilibrium proﬁt of the upstream monopolist
also increases with product diﬀerentiation. Hence, industry proﬁts are higher with
more diﬀerentiation. Consider now the consumer surplus. As shown in Appendix
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that is, the consumer surplus increases with product diﬀerentiation. Intuitively,
consumers’ preference for variety and the increase in equilibrium quantities com-
pound to increase consumers’ welfare even if equilibrium prices increase.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have studied vertical integration and product innovation as in-
terdependent strategic choices of vertically related ﬁrms. Our main innovation with
respect to the previous literature on vertical integration is that we have considered
product diﬀerentiation as a non-production strategic decision of the downstream
ﬁrms, showing its impact on the incentive for vertical integration and market fore-
closure. Our main innovation relative to the literature on product innovation, is
that, besides product market competition, we have accounted for another source of
competition capable of aﬀecting product innovation by innovative ﬁrms vertically
related to a monopolistic supplier, i.e., the threat of vertical integration. Due to
the downstream ﬁrms’ inability to commit to a cooperative behaviour if asked for
integration oﬀers, the monopolistic supplier can use vertical integration as a means
to reap proﬁts in the downstream market. As a consequence, the incentive to dif-
ferentiate products in the downstream market incorporates the strategic motive
21More precisely, the expression above gives the consumer surplus as a function of the consumer’s
optimal demands of goods q1 and q2 at given prices.
26of preventing vertical integration, which may lead to less innovation in the down-
stream market. Therefore, instead of market foreclosure, less product innovation
may be the social cost of a lenient antitrust policy which allows vertical integration
in innovative markets.
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29Appendix 1
We prove that the surplus form integration before the integration cost, S,i sa
U-shaped function of the degree of product diﬀerentiation over the range γ ∈ [0,1].








−64 + 32γ +9 6 γ2 +4 0 γ3 − γ4 − 3γ5¢
(8 − 3γ2)




8 − 3γ2¢2 (2 + γ)








−64 + 32γ +9 6 γ2 +4 0 γ3 − γ4 − 3γ5ª
.
Using Mathematica, we ﬁnd that the polynomial on the RHS has an unique real
root within the admissible range [0,1],t h a ti sγm ' 0.61037.S i n c e
∂S(γ)
∂γ is con-
tinuous over [0,1],a n dt a k e sv a l u e s
∂S(γ)
∂γ |γ=0 = −0.25
¡a
2






¢2 > 0, then it must be negative for γ<γ m and positive for γ>γ m.








¢2,s ot h a t
S(0) >S (1).
Appendix 2
T h er e p r e s e n t a t i v ec o n s u m e r ’ s optimisation problem is:




s.t. p1q1 + p2q2 + m = I
where I is the consumer’s income in units of the numeraire good (m).
From the ﬁrst order conditions pi = a − qi − γqj (i,j =1 ,2; i 6= j) and the
budget constraint, we get:
m = I − a(b q1 + b q2)+(b q2
1 + b q2
2 +2 γb q1b q2),
where b qi denotes the consumer’s optimal demand of good i at given prices.
Substituting for m into the utility function, we get:




1 + b q2
2 +2 γb q1b q2).
Finally, the consumer surplus is:




1 + b q2
2 +2 γb q1b q2).
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